In spite of the very common opinion we show that QM is not complete and that it is possible to create prequantum models providing finer description of physical reality than QM. There exists (at least in theoretical models) dispersion free states and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle can be violated. Thus in spite of all "No-Go" theorems (e.g., von Neumann, Kochen and Specker,..., Bell) we found a realist basis of quantum mechanics. I think that our model would totally satisfy A. Einstein who was sure that QM is not complete and a finer description is possible.
Our representation is not standard model with hidden variables. In particular, this is not a reduction of the quantum model to the classical one. Moreover, we see that such a reduction is even in principle impossible. This impossibility is not the consequence of a mathematical theorem but it follows from the physical structure of the model. By our model quantum states are very rough images of domains in the space of fundamental parameters -PRESPACE. Those domains represent complexes of physical conditions. By our model both classical and quantum physics describe REDUCTION of PRESPACE-INFORMATION. As we have already mentioned, QM is not complete. In particular, there are prespace contexts which can be only represented by a so called hyperbolic quantum model.
1. "Classical" and "quantum" probabilities. The starting point of our considerations was the comparative analysis of so called classical and quantum probabilities. Such an analysis was performed in my book [1] and it demonstrated that, in fact, there are no "classical" and "quantum" probabilities. To understand the probabilistic foundations of QM in the right way we should forget about such funny (and totally meaningless) ideas as, e.g., irreducible quantum randomness. Instead of repeating that quantum and classical (in some versions micro and macro) worlds are described by totally different probabilistic calculi, we should find the conventional probabilistic roots of so called "quantum probabilities". To find such roots we should start with the most fundamental distinguishing feature of quantum probabilities, namely with interference of probabilities.
2. Interference of probabilities. There is the common opinion (e.g., see Feynman's book on path integrals) that there is crucial difference between classical and quantum probabilistic rules for addition of probabilities of alternatives:
and
However, in 2001 I demonstrated that so called quantum rule for interference of probabilities can be easily derived, see, e.g. [2] , by using the frequency von Mises approach to probability -probability as the limit of relative frequencies for a collective (random sequence). Thus there is no contradiction between the classical frequency probability theory and quantum probability theory. Quantum probability theory can be considered as a very special domain of the "classical" frequency probability theory. Quantum probabilistic domain is a proper domain of "classical" frequency probability theory. It was found [2] that beside of quantum-like trigonometric interference (2) we can obtain hyperbolic interference:
3. Contextual theory of probability. Our derivation of interference of probabilities is based only on one postulate:
Contextuality of probabilities: Probabilities depend on complexes of physical conditions.
We call complexes of physical conditions -(physical) contexts and probability models based on this postulate -contextual probabilistic models.
In particular, the frequency probability model of von Mises is, in fact, a contextual probabilistic model where contexts are represented by collectives.
But R. von Mises did not pay attention to the contextual aspect of his model and therefore he did not find formulas (2), (3) .
Recently [3] it was observed that by using the contextual interpretation of the conventional Kolmogorov model we can also obtain the interference of probabilities.
Conclusion: Interference of probabilities is not rigidly coupled with QM. Interference is a consequence of contextuality of probabilities.
If you like we propose a probabilistic formalization of ideas of N. Bohr that the whole experimental arrangement should be always taken into account. Unfortunately N. Bohr never did this by himself. He was mainly concentrated on so called individual phenomena (see [4] on an extended analysis of views of N. Bohr), i.e., individual contextuality. We are speaking about statistical contextuality.
4. Contextually sensitive random variables. Of course, nontrivial interference of probabilities can arise only for very special pairs a, b of random variables, namely random variables which are sensitive to perturbations of contexts produced by measurements. Let C be a context. We call the pair of (conventional, e.g. Kolmogorovian) random variables a, b contextually sensitive if the probability distribution for results of a measurement of the random variable b in the context C differs from its probability distribution for results of a measurement performed in a new context C a . The latter context is created by combination of in the original context C and the context corresponding to a measurement of a (e.g., filtration with respect of values of a). So the variable b is sensitive to changes of a context C induced by measurement of a and vice versa. The cos θ and cosh θ in formulas (2) and (3) give the measure of statistical perturbation induced by perturbation of context.
We underline that we speak not about perturbations of physical systems induced by measurements but by changes of complexes of physical conditions. Thus contextually sensitive random variables need not be Heisenbergian.
It seems that N. Bohr in his famous reply to A. Einstein on the EPRparadox tried to explain that physical observables under consideration are contextually sensitive. Unfortunately N. Bohr was sure that QM is complete.
5. Quantum-like probabilistic models. Since to get quantum-like interference of probabilities we use only contextuality of probability and no "really quantum features" it would be natural to suppose that such an interference can be found not only in experiments with microsystems, but in other experiments in which we measure contextually sensitive random vari-ables. In [5] it was conjectured that quantum-like probabilistic behaviour might be observed in experiments with cognitive systems. The main motivation was that cognitive systems are very complex information systems and mental observables are extremely sensitive to perturbations of context. This conjecture was confirmed by a series of psychological experiments [6] . Recently quantum-like behaviour of probabilities was also found in some games [7] .
6. Hilbert space representation of a contextual Kolmogorov model. Starting with the formula for interference of probabilities we constructed a Hilbert space representation of a contextual Kolmogorov model It was shown that for a Kolmogorov probability space K = (Ω, F , P) and a pair of incompatible Kolmogorovian random variables b and a we can construct a natural quantum representation. This representation is rigidly based on a pair of variables b and a -fundamental (for that concrete representation of physical reality) observables. In particular, the standard quantum representation is based on the position and momentum observables.
7. Prespace. Points of Ω are interpreted as fundamental physical parameters 1 . We call Ω prespace and fundamental parameters -prepoints. The main distinguishing feature of the representation map is the huge compression of information. In particular, every point represented in the conventional mathematical model of physical space by a vector x ∈ R 3 is the image of a subset
of Ω which can contain millions of prepoints. In the conventional quantum representation of the prespace the fundamental variable b = q is the position observable.
8. Classical probability and classical physics. There is again a rather common tendency to identify classical probability and classical physics. This is totally wrong idea.
Classical physics provides the description of some physical phenomena by using Newtonian (or Hamiltonian) mechanics and the model R 3 for the "physical space" and R for the time, where R is the real line. So impossibility of classical description of some phenomena should be considered as impossibility to embed such phenomena in the Newtonian R 3 -model (with continuous real time). And if we read carefully N. Bohr and W. Heisenberg we understand immediately that they had in mind precisely this idea on the impossibility of classical reduction of QM. However, later (mainly due to efforts of quantum logic and Bellian community) classical description was identified with classical probabilistic description. This induces the above mentioned view: classical probability iff classical physics.
As we have already pointed out quantum probabilistic calculus can be obtained in the classical (but contextual) probabilistic framework. Moreover, quantum probabilistic calculus can successfully used in some classical physical models [8] .
However, the existence of a prequantum classical probabilistic model does not imply the reduction of quantum physics to classical. In our model it is impossible to imbed quantum phenomena in Newtonian model in the physical space. There exist physical contexts which could not be described by using the physical space coordinates. Such contexts can be represented only by vectors of a Hilbert space.
Thus our approach is totally in accordance with views of N. Bohr and W. Heisenberg. However, I think that we should say "Farewell" to the physical R 3 -space and not to classical probability.
